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ABSTRACT
We propose mechanisms whereby access to proprietary
data can be made difficult to the unauthorized user.
Programs must be able to check that they are running on
the right computer with the right users and be able to
react with alarm when a check fails.
Problem S tatement
It is illegal to burglarize a safe; it is also hard to
do. If we achieve legal safeguards for computer data,
we also must make it hard to violate them. If we do,
then most people will not bother to try; if they do try,
it will be demonstrated that the violation was intentional.
Among the many situations where we would like some measure
of protection are:
(1) Proprietary Programs
In order to make possible the sale of programs
for less than their development cost, we must
prevent unauthorized use of the ones sold, by
other people, or on other machines, or in different
organizations.
(2) Files on a Public Device
Even though a memory is public (the disk), the
information in a file may need protection either
to prevent it from being disturbed or because
it is confidential.
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Keys
An individual -key is associated with a person; a device
 
key is associated with a machine; an environment
is associated with a measurable attribute of the
surroundings. A key may be either specific or arbitrary.
For example:
Specific	 Arbitrary_
Individual
	 Fingerprint, voice pattern password
signature, social, security
number
Device	 Machine manufacturer's 	 Name of
serial number	 purchaser
Environment	 Time and date, local
magnetic field
A key expression, is a logical combination of the presence
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that are true only if the corresponding key is present. Then
(KI A K2 ) V (K3 A K4) . . ,
expresses the interlock on ICBM launch sites where both
members of a specific set of pairs must be present to activate.
(Kl V K2) A (K1 V K2)
expresses a necessary lockout on an airline washroom if K1
belongs to a man and K 2 to a woman, etc,
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A key can be checked at any time, but usually as soon as
access to the protected data is attempted. When a key
check fails, an alarm is activated.
Alarms
Alarms come in increasingly vigorous versions. For example:
(1) Access to data refused.
(2) Further access to computer complex refused.
(3) Illegally accessed file destroyed.
(4) Operator notified.
(5) Owner of data notified..
(6) Police notified;
(7) Machine destroyed.
(8) Local environment destroyed.
Which alarm is appropriate depends upon the circumstances.
(7) or (8) would be applicable as protection to military
classified data.
Protection
Protection is a kind of control; it-must then necessarily
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lie somewhere on the path of access to the data. The
main problems are in deciding where best to place it and
how to check it,,
There is some difference in program nrotection and data
protection. A program is active and can check itself,
data normally cannot (the chicken that laid the golden
egg could squawk when stolen, the egg could not). Pro-
gram loses this attribute when treated like data (cooked
chicken doesn't squawk about being eaten).
No system of locks is foolproof. The general solution
to a lock is to step outside its domain of applicability:
(1) If you don't know the safe combination, feel or
1J.stcil for the tuiTibler action;
(2) if the tumblers are too good, drill the lock off;
(3) if the safe is boobytrapped, kidnap the owner to
open it;
(4) if the owner refuses, torture his children, etc.
We measure the success of a lock by:
(1) The ratio of difficulty in illegal and authorized
access.
(2) Probability of success in obtaining access with
randomly selected keys.
(3) Probability in detecting access before damage is done.
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Once an alarm is enplanted, our next line of defense is
to prevent an alarmectomy. The procedure can be carried
as many levels as desired although two is probably plenty.
Implementation
For the remainder of this note, we are concerned with
techniques for achieving protection.
A machine readable ID card and the associated reader can be
used to establish individual identity. This technique is
directly applicable to console use in a remote access en-
vironment where billing information is needed. The card
reader may also confiscate cards that are being illegally
used as in a gas station set-up.
Any specific individual key needs recognition. Here we
play the probabilities; the recognizer must be sufficiently
likely to accept the authorized individual, sufficiently
likely to reject all others.
A program can be made to run only on a specific computer
if provision is made to read the machine serial number.
The instruction is
CAB
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Compare And Burn, which compares the actual machine number
with the proffered key and activates an alarm if they
are not equal. Slightly more general, the purchaser
could request some one arbitrary bit pattern for all his
machines. Then any programs he buys will run on all his
computers. The preparation of the program will, of course,
involve the machine dependency.
An alarmectomy protection for CAB is provided by
SAB
Sum And Burn, which checksums the program space and compares
with the appropriate compiler generated constant. A
further level of protection is provided if the SAB does
not appear explicitly but is subtly manufactured by the
program during execution. A different kind of alarmectomy
backup for CAB is to flag at compile time all code as
"program only". The computer will cause a Burn to be
executed if code is fetched as data.
If a program is to be run only on a specific day or at
some specific time, the clock can provide a key. If the
machine is not to be moved, the local magnetic field pro-
vides a key, etc.
There are various ways to sound the alarm. One particularly
useful way is to clear the program space and registers
to prevent the memory-dump gambit for getting around the
locks,, Related, when a file has to be moved from one
device to another, the old copy must be destroyed or
at least marked "inaccessible". Furthermore, no peeking
in transit can be allowed.
Summary
The same techniques long used in protecting other valuables
can be applied to computer systems. The essential ploy
is to make the probable cost of illegal access much
higher than the probable reward while keeping the probable
cost of legal access correspondingly low. Some additions
to present hardware are needed.
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